Registry Wire

What the courts have decided

After a bench trial, the district court held that the sign mandate compels speech and fails strict scrutiny, and enjoined it statewide. On January 2, 2026 an Eighth Circuit panel (Kelly, J., with Loken and Erickson, JJ.) affirmed on the merits but vacated the statewide injunction so its scope could be reconsidered under Trump v. CASA. Rehearing was denied February 6. According to Sanderson's brief, the district court on remand narrowed the injunction to him alone on May 29, 2026, with his agreement.

The rest of § 589.426 was not challenged: on October 31 registrants must avoid Halloween-related contact with children, stay inside from 5 p.m. to 10:30 p.m. unless they have just cause to be elsewhere, and leave outside lights off.

The parties also tell Sanderson's own history differently. Missouri says he ignored the statute for years before police caught him in 2022. His brief says two police departments told him the Halloween rules did not apply to him because they postdated his offense, citing the Missouri Supreme Court's 2010 decision in F.R. v. St. Charles County Sheriff's Department. Missouri replies that he pleaded guilty and never challenged that conviction.

What happens next

The petition is set for the justices' October 9 conference. The Court can grant review, deny it, or carry it to a later conference; granting takes four votes. If review is denied, the Eighth Circuit's decision remains binding in federal courts in Arkansas, Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota.

This piece sets out the arguments as each side made them in its filings. The Wire takes no position on which is right.

The petition and its three conditions

North Carolina registration lasts at least 30 years unless, after ten years, the registrant successfully petitions the superior court under N.C.G.S. § 14-208.12A. Subsection (a1) lets the court grant relief if three things are true: the petitioner has not been arrested for a registrable crime since completing the sentence; the relief "complies with the provisions of the federal Jacob Wetterling Act, as amended, and any other federal standards"; and the court "is otherwise satisfied that the petitioner is not a current or potential threat to public safety." Subsection (a3) adds that if the court denies the petition, "the person may again petition the court for relief" one year from the denial.

The second condition is what brings federal law in. As the opinion explains, the federal standard is SORNA's minimum registration periods in 34 U.S.C. § 20915 — 15 years for a Tier I offender, 25 for Tier II, life for Tier III — so a North Carolina judge deciding a petition often has to decide which federal tier the state conviction corresponds to.

What happened to William Lingerfelt

Lingerfelt pleaded guilty in 2003 to two counts of sexual activity by a substitute parent and registered that February. He petitioned three times. In 2017 the trial court denied the petition as premature without ruling on his tier. In 2019 it ruled him a Tier II offender — the judge handwrote "Tier 2 Offense. 25 Year Min." on the form — and denied relief. He did not appeal, although the opinion notes the order was "a final, appealable judgment." In 2023 the court denied a third petition on the same ground, and this time he appealed, arguing he was Tier I and therefore already eligible. A divided Court of Appeals held he was Tier II; the dissent there would have found him Tier I and sent the case back. He came to the Supreme Court as of right on that dissent.

After oral argument in September 2025 the court ordered supplemental briefing on a question neither side had raised: whether the 2019 tier ruling was "the law of the case or was otherwise binding" on the later petition. It reheard the case in February 2026.

What the majority held

Writing for the court, Justice Dietz drew a line between the public-safety condition and the tier condition. The refiling provision, he wrote, gives a registrant a year "in which the offender can make life changes that might address the court's concerns", so a finding that someone is a threat to public safety "is not subject to issue preclusion" — a later judge may decide differently "even on largely identical facts." A tier calculation is different: it is "a legal question with only one objectively correct answer."

If Lingerfelt believed the trial court's first ruling was an error, he was required to appeal that ruling to avoid its preclusive effect in future petitions.— State v. Lingerfelt, No. 38A25, slip op. at 8 (N.C. Aug. 14, 2026) (Dietz, J.)

The court then decided which doctrine does the binding, and the choice decided the case. Collateral estoppel governs rulings from a separate proceeding, but it is an affirmative defense that a party has to raise, and the State had not raised it against the 2023 petition — so under that doctrine the issue would have been waived. Law of the case governs rulings within the same proceeding, and the opinion describes it as "a question of law for the courts" rather than a defense a litigant asserts. The court held that successive § 14-208.12A petitions are "all part of the same underlying proceeding": they resemble post-conviction filings, the statute puts them on the criminal docket to be calendared by the district attorney, and all three of Lingerfelt's petitions carried the case number of his original criminal case.

The State had not argued law of the case in the Court of Appeals either. The majority held that did not matter, because the State was the appellee: an appellate court reviews only the arguments an appellant raises, but "must affirm lower court rulings if there is any legal ground to do so," whether or not the appellee briefed it.

What the dissent argued

Justice Riggs, joined by Justice Earls, would have held that each petition is a new action. The dissent makes four points. The statute lists its three conditions together and does not mark some as revisitable and others as settled. A one-year refiling period would make little sense for a binding tier ruling, since the gap between tier minimums is ten years or more. The legislature wrote explicit procedural bars for motions for appropriate relief in § 15A-1419 and wrote none here. And tier is not always a pure legal question: the court's own decision in State v. Moir directs a fact-specific approach to age-related tier issues.

The dissent also objected to how the issue arrived. According to the dissent, both the State and Lingerfelt agreed that the refiling provision displaces law of the case, and neither party argued the doctrine at any stage, including in the supplemental briefs the court requested — so in the dissent's view it was not preserved.

What the court did not decide

Lingerfelt's tier. The question the case came up on — whether sexual activity by a substitute parent under § 14-27.7(a) matches a federal Tier II offense — was not answered. The court modified and affirmed "without addressing the remainder" of the Court of Appeals' analysis, so the categorical-match reasoning that divided that court has neither been adopted nor rejected by the Supreme Court.

Rulings never made. The 2017 denial, which declined to decide the tier, did not bind anything. The holding reaches legal rulings actually made in a final order that went unappealed.

The public-safety finding. That stays open to fresh decision on every petition, which the majority treats as the point of the one-year refiling rule.

Mixed questions. The majority treats tier as purely legal. The dissent's point about fact-specific age determinations under Moir is not answered in the majority opinion, so how the rule applies when a tier turns on facts found at a hearing is left for a later case.

What it means in practice

For a North Carolina registrant, the first petition that produces a tier ruling is the one that counts: a legal ruling against the petitioner has to be appealed then, or it applies to every later petition in the same case. A denial on public-safety grounds can still be revisited a year later. The decision is final; the Case Law Library carries it as good law. The Wire takes no position on the rule.

Two near-identical cases

Mark Korson pleaded guilty to sexual battery under § 794.011(5) in 1992 and finished probation in 1999. Angel Garcia pleaded guilty to the same offense in 1991 and was released from supervision in 2000. Each asked to come off the registry under the version of § 943.0435(11) in force when he finished his sentence, which then allowed a petition after 20 years without an arrest. Since 2007 the statute has required 25 years and has excluded adult convictions under § 794.011. In both cases the trial judge applied the older version and granted removal.

Where the courts agree

Both appeals courts said the trial judges used the wrong statute. Because § 943.0435 is procedural, the version in force when the petition is filed governs, and under it neither man was eligible. The Second District said so in Korson as guidance to trial courts after dismissing the appeal, noting that State appeals of removal orders “are arising with some frequency.” Garcia cites Korson for the same point.

Where they split

Second District (Korson). Relying on its en banc decision in King v. State and on the Florida Supreme Court's decision in LaFave v. State, the court treated a removal petition as part of the criminal case. No rule gives the State an appeal from that kind of order, and LaFave rules out certiorari review of a final order the State has no right to appeal. The court dismissed, and Korson's removal order stood.

Fourth District (Garcia). The court held removal proceedings are civil, pointing to § 943.0435(12), which says a sexual offender designation “is not a sentence or a punishment,” and to Smith v. Doe. FDLE had moved to vacate under § 943.0436(3), which lets an agency move within a year to set aside an order affecting its duties under the registry laws. The court held FDLE had standing both to make that motion and to appeal its denial. “We disagree with Korson's jurisdictional analysis,” it wrote, and it ordered Garcia's removal order struck.

Why it matters

The same trial-court error now has different results depending on the district. In the Second District, an order removing someone the statute makes ineligible cannot be reviewed on the State's appeal. In the Fourth, FDLE can ask the trial court to set it aside within a year and appeal if refused. Since October 1, 2024 the statute has also given FDLE, as well as the state attorney, notice of each petition and the right to oppose it at the hearing (ch. 2024-73, noted in Garcia). That gives FDLE a voice before an order is entered, but it does not settle whether the State can appeal afterwards.

What is still open

Garcia is not final until any timely rehearing motion is decided, and the opinion does not certify a conflict. Because it expressly disagrees with Korson, it is the kind of decision the Florida Supreme Court may review under Article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, which reaches district court decisions that “expressly and directly conflict” with another district's. The Court declined to review Korson on February 10, 2026, and a second Second District case, Perdomo, on August 14. Neither order addressed the merits.

Two other questions are left open. Garcia did not decide FDLE's argument that federal SORNA would still require the petitioner to register. And both courts treated § 943.0435 as procedural without discussing § 943.0436(1), in which the Legislature states that “the laws relating to sexual predators and sexual offenders are substantive law.”